Darfur’s Armed Movements: Evolution of Roles and Relations with Actors in light of the April 15 War— Historical Background

This article is the first in a series titled “Darfur’s Armed Movements: Evolution of Roles and Relations with Actors in light of the April 15 War.” It offers a historical overview of the conflict in Darfur, highlighting key agreements involving the parties from 2003 up to the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) in 2020.

The section aims to provide readers with the essential historical context needed to engage with the research team’s analysis. It also outlines the study’s methodology and broader objectives, which will be explored in more detail in the following sections.

Outline

This research comes in eight main sections, comprising a historical background of the conflicts in Sudan in general and Darfur in particular; an intro to armed movements active in Darfur the research team have monitored; and an extensive analysis of interviews the team conducted with members of the armed movements, independent actors and the native administrations.

Focusing on the Darfuri armed movements’ evolution of roles during the April 15 War, an analysis of respondents’ responses highlights varying takes on the impact of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA). While some deems it futile as to resolve conflicts, others admittedly view it as a step conducive for the attainment of peace. The research also incorporates extensive analysis of armed movements’ relations with different actors, vetting their relationship with the native administrations, civil society, and the political parties in Darfur, as well as the political/military coordination between the movements among themselves.

Research Introduction

Sudan’s Darfur region has long since been suffering from the armed conflicts and political turmoil, all affecting citizens’ daily lives and threatening stability; not solely in the region, but across all of Sudan. The research focuses on armed movements’ roles in Darfur in the course of the current war, in an attempt to comprehend perspectives of different actors of armed movements and their expected role in this context. The research analyzes the responses of respondents and independent actors so as to identify key roles that the armed movements play in the current situation. Moreover, the research reviews the impact of the JPA upon the political and security situation in Darfur and the views of members of armed movements and other actors vis-a-vis its implementation and effectiveness.

The research hopes to explore and analyze the political situation in Darfur at large, and the evolution of the roles of the Darfur armed movements to help better understand the dynamics and challenges affecting stability in the region. By examining relations of the armed movements with other actors, assessing their roles and the impact of the war on the JPA, the research contributes to steer efforts towards enhancing understanding and achieving peace and stability in Darfur. However, the study is essential as it sheds light on the key factors shaping the political challenges in the region; and provides a comprehensive view of the current political reality in Darfur, so as to help relevant actors take appropriate decisions to achieve peace and stability in this volatile region.

The research aims to identify the following

  • Getting sense of the development of the roles of armed movements in Darfur, in addition to studying the relations among the movements and analyzing the impact of the April 15, 2023 war on them, with a focus on military coordination and factors contributing to the formation of various alliances, and analyzing their positions on the war.
  • Understanding the movements’ relations with other actors in Darfur, such as the political parties, citizens, native administration, and the civil society; and analyzing how these relations have been affected by the war. In addition to studying the roles played by the native administration in Darfur and analyzing how these roles have been affected by the war.
  • Studying Darfur’s armed movements and actors’ discernments in regard to the JPA; and analyzing the impact of the war on the future of the Agreement.

Research Methodology and Data Collection Methods

This research followed a methodology of mainly using the qualitative approach, by conducting direct interviews with a variety of people with expertise and experience in Darfur. Participants were meticulously picked to ensure an inclusive and balanced representation of different opinions and experiences in the course of the war, political issues and society in the region.

Direct interviews were conducted with armed movements members, independent political and civilian actors in Darfur, as well as a member of native administration. Detailed questions were asked to fathom their views and perceptions about the armed movements roles and their impact on the political, social and economic situation in the region.

Remote interviews were conducted via Zoom platform so as to record conversations and maintain accuracy of information. Interviews’ content was carefully analyzed to understand extracted patterns and central themes, allowing for comprehensive insights into the armed movements’ role and impact on the situation in Darfur. The team conducted a questionnaire using Kobo Toolbox to collect data from individuals who did not want to conduct face-to-face interviews, however, owing to the preference of all respondents to do face-to-face interviews, the questionnaire was not used in the data collection process.

The team adopted objective analysis seeking to identify, analyze, and interpret patterns in interviews, applying coding to extract common themes in respondents’ responses and group them into focal points.

Within the research framework, the team conducted 12 face-to-face interviews and panel discussions, distributed as follows:

  • Five interviews with independent civil/political actors in Darfur.
  • Six interviews with members of armed movements:
  1. Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces led by at-Tahir Hajar (GSLF).
  2. Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – Transitional Council led by al-Hadi Idris (SLM/TC-Hadi Idris).
  3. Sudan Liberation Movement/Army led by Abd al-Wahid M. Nur (SLM/AW).
  4. Justice and Equality Movement; Jibril Ibrahim wing (JEM-Jibril).
  5. Justice and Equality Movement; Sandal Haggar wing (JEM-Haggar).
  6. Sudan Liberation Movement/Army led by Minni Arko Minawi (SLM/Minawi).
  • Panel discussion involving: members of SLM/AW; SLM/Minawi; GSLF; and independent activists and researchers on Darfur issues.
  • Interview with a member of the native administration in North Darfur.

A number of members of native administrations in different areas of Darfur was contacted by the research team, however, chances to directly interview a large number of them were meager due to internet outages in some states.

Secondary information and open sources: to bridge the gap and compensate for lack of information, the team relied mainly on the reports and statements by native administrations and armed movements published on their official pages and various news channels. The team was careful not to provide any analysis reflecting the direction of the armed movement without relying on explicit texts issued by the movement or its senior leaders. The team also relied on a number of news reports and research to support cross-checking of the information mentioned by the participants.

Actors in this research were identified by the team based on specific criteria for each category:

  • Armed movements: refers to active armed political movements in the Darfur region. Members in positions to be informed and who are also authorized to speak on behalf of their movements have been selected to provide reliable/accurate information. The team maintains anonymity of these members for security reasons.
  • Independent actors: refers to individuals not belonging to any armed movement/political organization and yet publicly active in Darfur, provided that they are well-known and prominent figures in the Darfuri society, and that they enjoy an obvious clear influence and contributions to society. These individuals have been carefully selected to ensure an inclusive and reliable representation of the views of the population in Darfur.

These two main categories were adopted in the research to ensure diversity and inclusiveness of the opinions and information provided. Although positions were not precisely mentioned for security reasons, careful identification of these two categories has contributed to the collection of a variety of comprehensive data to analyze the role of armed movements in Darfur more fully and accurately.

The research covered the period April 2023 through January 2024, where it tried to cover most of the developments related to Darfur and the various actors during the mentioned period.

Conflict in Darfur

The history of conflicts in Sudan dates back to the pre-independence period of the Sudanese state. The first armed conflict broke out in August 1955 after a Sudanese Army Forces (SAF) battalion rebelled in the southern area of Torit, just four months before Sudan’s declaration of independence. This armed conflict has sparked a series of civil wars raging so far.

The Torit rebellion marked the beginning of the formation of the Ananya 1 movement led by Joseph Lago, an SAF officer. The Ananya 1 had led the first southern war against successive Sudanese governments until a peace agreement was reached with former President Ja’fer Nimeiri in March 1972, ending the first civil war after nearly 17 years.

However, this peace was short-lived, as the second South War broke out in May 1983, when the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by former SAF officer, John Garang, declared its rebellion against the government of Ja’fer Nimeiri. This war ended in January 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which granted South Sudan the right to self-determination. In February 2011, the results of the referendum were announced with a majority approval of secession from a united Sudan, and secession was officially declared in July 2011.

Although the government of former President Omar al-Bashir succeeded in ending the second southern war, Sudan was faced with a third civil war in Darfur, where the insurgency broke out in February 2003. Armed conflicts erupted in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan regions in mid-2011 ahead of South Sudan’s independence, led by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N).

Protesting against discrimination and inequality in Darfur dates back to 1957 and was led by the Red Flames Movement, which called for the political system reformation and improving the Darfuri citizens’ situation. However, the spark of armed protest against the government of Sudan in the name of Darfur was in 1992 when Da’oud Yahia Bolad broke away from the Inqaz (Salvation) Government and joined the SPLM led by John Garang and formed an armed group based in Jabel Marra.

In 2003, the Darfur war erupted when the SLM/A and JEM declared their rebellion against the Khartoum government. Darfuri armed movements raised arms against al-Bashir’s government after the discourse of grievance and the government’s marginalization of the Darfur region reached its peak in 2000 and 2001. The movements called for development and an end to discrimination against the people of Darfur.

The armed movements were vehemently fought off by the government; where Darfur has witnessed from 2003 to 2016 intricate events and protracted cycles of violence, which further complicated the armed conflict as the war in Darfur continued, drawing the attention of the international community. An investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity in the region was initiated by the International Criminal Court (ICC), filing charges against the Sudanese government, which has refused to recognize the ICC’s jurisdiction. (ajnet, 2016)

Throughout the war, the armed movements suffered defections, and the government reached peace agreements with some of those factions. Tensions, however, persisted in Darfur, and the government was accused of crimes against civilians. In 2008, the government accepted the deployment of a joint United Nations- African Union peacekeeping mission (UNAMID).

In March 2009, the ICC issued an arrest warrant against the Sudanese President, Omer al-Bashir, on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. This has led to mounting international attention to the crisis in Darfur. In November 2011, the Liberation and Justice Movement led by at-Tijani Sisi and JEM both signed a peace agreement with the government in Doha, while the rest of the movements refused to join the agreement, leading to continued tensions in the region.

A referendum was organized by the government in April 2016, to determine the administrative status of Darfur, whereby voters had to choose between the formation of a single region with a broad powers government; or maintaining the current administrative status, under which the region is divided into five states. The referendum favored the 5-state option. Talks between the government and rebel movements continued from 2014 to 2016, however no final settlement was reached.  (ajnet, 2016)

This briefing reflects the enormous challenges Darfur has confronted, including ongoing conflicts, fragmentation of armed movements, and accusations of crimes against humanity and war crimes.

Darfur-Related Agreements

Darfur has witnessed the signing of many agreements which have had considerable impact on the situation of the region. These could be summarized as follows:

On September 3, 2003, the Abéché Agreement was signed between the Sudanese government and SLM/A in Abéché, Chad. The agreement aimed to calm the situation and restore security in Darfur, where the parties committed to a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities. Agreements were also reached regarding control of irregular armed groups, the release of war prisoners and the cantonment of SLM/A forces. The agreement included clauses promoting lasting and comprehensive peace in the region, in addition to the formation of a tripartite committee to follow up on the implementation of the agreement. The agreement entered into force immediately after signing and allowed for a third-party mediator in case of disagreements between the parties.

In June 2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement under the auspices of the African Union, was signed in Abuja in May of the same year between the Sudanese government and SLM/Minawi, in an attempt to end violence in the region.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) noted that the document contained significant flaws, as two of its four parties rejected it; also the intensity of fighting between rebels and government forces have only somewhat decreased. In its report, the ICG cited increased violence in some areas after the signing of the agreement due to differences between the factions of SLM/A, the escalation of tribal conflicts and turmoil at the Chadian border. (Crisis Group, 2016)

SLM/AW and JEM both refused to sign the agreement for reasons related to direct participation and wealth/power sharing arrangements; while stressing that the underlying causes of conflict were not adequately addressed, which contributed to the disintegration of the movements into ethnic blocs.

On July 14, 2011, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) was signed between the Sudanese government and the Liberation and Justice Movement led by Tijani Sisi. This represented an important step towards resolving crises in the region. The 106-page document addressed a variety of issues: human rights, power and wealth sharing, reparations, and the return of displaced people. The State of Qatar was also the mediator in this agreement, which extended for thirty months of negotiations. In April 2013, the government and JEM signed an additional agreement in Qatar, and eventually, in April 2016, a referendum was organized to determine the administrative status of Darfur in accordance with the DDPD provisions.

In April 2013, a breakaway faction of JEM signed the DDPD. The agreement included the participation of the movement at various levels of governance in Sudan, as well as at Darfur transitional authority. However, it did not achieve much progress. The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, said in January 2013 that its implementation was limited.

JEM’s accession to DDPD came as a continuation of peace efforts in 2011 that included the Liberation and Justice Movement. These events eventually led to the formation of a transitional authority for the region.

On August 8, 2014, the head of the National Umma Party (NUP), as-Sadiq al-Mahdi, and the head of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front, Malik Agar, signed in Paris, disjointedly from the Sudanese government, a declaration committing the Revolutionary Front to a two-month cessation of hostilities in all operation areas across Sudan. The Agreement aimed at addressing the humanitarian crisis and seeking solutions to the overall humanitarian/political situation in the country. The meeting included Mariam as-Sadiq, Vice-Chairman of NUP, Abd al-Wahid M. Nur, Chairman of SAL/AW, Jibril Ibrahim, Chairman of JEM, Toam Hajo, dissident leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, Yasir Arman, Secretary-General of the SPLM-N, and Tarawiah Ahmed Ali, leader at SLM/Minawi.

The declaration included details on the commitment to a unilateral cessation of hostilities. Various parties were invited to engage in an inclusive dialogue aimed at resolving the Sudanese crisis. The declaration also stressed the need to continue efforts to support international and regional endeavors to achieve peace and stability in Sudan, leaving the door open to all forces wishing to join, meanwhile stressing the importance of peaceful solutions and comprehensive cooperation to achieve progress in the humanitarian/political situation in the country.

On December 3, 2014, the Sudanese opposition parties, armed movements and civil society organizations signed an agreement in Addis Ababa under the title: “Sudan Call” disjointedly from the Sudanese government, with the aim of stopping the war, dismantling the one-party state, and achieving comprehensive peace and democratic transition. Among the most prominent bodies that signed the agreement are the NUP, the National Consensus Forces, the Revolutionary Front, the Darfur Movements Alliance, and the SPLM-N.

On January 27, 2014, the Sudanese President, Omer al-Bashir, launched “al-Wathba” (the Leap) project for national dialogue between various civilian/military components of the Sudanese people; whereby all engaged in a national dialogue, including, the National Congress Party, the Democratic Unionist Party led by Mohamed Othman al-Mirghani, the Popular Congress Party led by Hassan at-Turabi, the Democratic Unionist Party, the Just Peace Platform Party, the Federal Truth Party, the Arab Baath Party, the Nasserist Socialist Party, in addition to the Darfur movements signatory to the DDPD, which turned into parties such as: the National Liberation and Justice Party headed by Tijani Sisi, the Liberation and Justice Party headed by Bahar Idris Abu Garda, the Sudanese Democratic Socialist Union, and the SPLM-Peace Wing, and other small parties, which numbered in total around 78 entities, according to the National Dialogue papers.

Some parties refused to participate, including the NUP, the Reform Now Movement, the Sudanese Congress Party, the Sudanese Communist Party, the Justice Party, the Arab Nasserist Socialist Party, the Arab Baath Socialist Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, and the Movement of New Democratic Forces (HAQ). Armed movements that refused to sign also included JEM, SLM/Minawi and SLM/AW, SPLM-N, and other small armed movements in Darfur.

On August 8, 2016, parties to the Sudan Call coalition signed a roadmap presented by the African Mechanism in March 2016, that was also signed by the Sudanese government at the time. Having reservations about the African mechanism’s proposal, the Sudan Call forces hag later submitted an annex demanding incorporation with the roadmap. As for the opposition National Consensus Forces, their positions varied, as some were supportive of signing the African roadmap, such as the Sudanese Congress Party, which attended the signing ceremony in Addis Ababa, while others rejected the memorandum, such as the Sudanese Communist Party. The signatories agreed on a roadmap with the following three key objectives (skynewsarabia, 1969):

  1. Parties commitment to participate in negotiations aimed at peacefully ending hostilities in Darfur, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile states.
  2. Ensuring that crucial humanitarian assistance reaches the affected population.
  3. Commitment of parties that the Sudanese people should inclusively participate in a national dialogue to address various challenges facing the country.

On January 23, 2017, a peace agreement was signed in Doha between the Sudanese government and the SLM-The Second Revolution, in the hope that other movements would join the DDPD. The parties to the agreement aspired that lifting of US sanctions and the constitutional reforms which preceded the agreement would enhance its chances of success.

The JPA was signed in 2020 between the Sudanese government and a range of armed movements. The aim of the agreement was to define constitutional and political frameworks for the country during the transition period, focusing on issues such as power-sharing, revenues and transitional justice. Following the agreement, the 2019 Constitutional Charter was amended to conform to some of the JPA’s provisions, and the features of the permanent constitution expected to be drafted were defined. The JPA also deemed Sudan an unequal federal state, revisiting the different powers for Darfur.

The JPA also incorporated a security arrangements clause, providing for the integration of members of armed movements into the Sudanese regular forces. The Agreement, further, stipulated the prioritization of judicial mechanisms over reconciliation in some cases. It also showed additional democratic challenges to ensure compatibility with the will of the popular revolution and bridging the democratic gap.

Parties signatory to the JPA with the Transitional Government of Sudan were as follows (Al-Ali, 2021):

  • Darfur Path: JEM; SLM/Minawi, SLM-TC; the Sudanese Alliance; GSLF; Sudan Liberation Movement.
  • Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/North – Malik Agar (SPLM/N-Agar).
  • The Eastern Path: The United People’s Front for Liberation and Justice and the Beja Congress Party – Opposition.
  • The Northern Path: Kush Liberation Movement and the Northern Entity.
  • The Central Path: led by the Revolutionary Democratic Front Party and comprising political parties and Sufi groups.
  • The Third Front – Tamazuj: Faction of SPLM-N.

However, two leading movements have not joined the JPA: SLM/AW and SPLM-N led by Abd al-Aziz al-Hilu (SPLM/al-Hilu).

References:

  1. ajnet (2016). أزمة دارفور من 2003 إلى 2016, ajnet. Available at: link (Accessed: 20 July 2024).
  2. Abu Bakr, O. (2023). الميليشيات المسلحة ومعضلة التحوّل المدني الديمقراطي في السودان, Arab Reform Initiative. Available at: link (Accessed: 20 July 2024).
  3. Crisis Group (2016). اتفاق السلام الهش في دارفور, Crisis Group. Available at: link (Accessed: 20 July 2024).
  4. skynewsarabia (1969). الحكومة السودانية والمعارضة توقعان على خريطة طريق, Skynews Arabia. Available at: link (Accessed: 20 July 2024).
  5. Al-Ali, Z. (2021). The Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan, Idea. Available at: link (Accessed: 19 July 2024).

Latests Publications

  • All Posts
  • Analytical Articles
  • Data Snapshot
  • Monthly Report
  • Research Papers
  • Special Report