{"id":4455,"date":"2025-02-06T18:44:00","date_gmt":"2025-02-06T18:44:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/insights-sd.org\/?p=4455"},"modified":"2025-09-17T12:28:35","modified_gmt":"2025-09-17T12:28:35","slug":"sudan-conflict-monthly-multi-front-offensive-operations-shape-safs-advances","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/insights-sd.org\/en\/sudan-conflict-monthly-multi-front-offensive-operations-shape-safs-advances\/","title":{"rendered":"Sudan Conflict Monthly: Multi-Front Offensive Operations Shape\u00a0SAF\u2019s\u00a0Advances"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<div class=\"wp-block-columns is-layout-flex wp-container-core-columns-is-layout-7387b849 wp-block-columns-is-layout-flex\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-column is-layout-flow wp-block-column-is-layout-flow\">\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"827\" src=\"https:\/\/insights-sd.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/OP-3-1024x827.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-3484\" srcset=\"https:\/\/insights-sd.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/OP-3-1024x827.png 1024w, https:\/\/insights-sd.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/OP-3-300x242.png 300w, https:\/\/insights-sd.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/OP-3-768x620.png 768w, https:\/\/insights-sd.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/OP-3-1536x1240.png 1536w, https:\/\/insights-sd.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/OP-3-2048x1654.png 2048w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:100px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Multi-Front Offensive Operations Shape SAF&#8217;s Advances<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Throughout January, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) continued their offensive in the central region, achieving significant victories that culminated in the recapture of Wad Madani, the capital of al-Jazeera State. The city had fallen under the control of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in December 2023. Since taking control of the strategic Jabel Moya area in Sinnar State last October, the SAF has maintained an offensive posture, reclaiming the cities of Sinja and ad-Dindir. In December, SAF also seized the Sinnar Sugar Plant, enabling further advances along the southern axis of al-Jazeera State.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:100px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">SAF Operations Toward Wad Madani<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In January, the SAF launched a coordinated assault on Wad Madani from three directions. From the western axis, forces advanced eastward from al-Managil, gaining control of several villages before reaching Mahala and at-Talha, located just 15 kilometers from Wad Madani. On the southern axis, units advancing from Sinnar captured al-Haj Abdalla in South al-Jazeera locality before pushing northward to as-Shukaba an-Nour, approximately 20 kilometers from the city.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Clashes in East al-Jazeera and the Impact of SSF Defection<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since the RSF took control of al-Jazeera State, the eastern axis has been a battleground, witnessing continuous clashes between SAF\u2014reinforced by Darfur Joint Force (DJF)\u2014and the RSF. Both sides have made advances and suffered setbacks. By late January 2024, RSF forces pushed eastward, reaching the \u201cMajor Khamsa\u201d area in al-Faw locality, al-Qadarif State, but were eventually repelled by the SAF. Despite multiple attempts, the SAF struggled to reclaim and hold East al-Jazeera.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, the situation shifted in October 2024 when the Sudan Shield Forces (SSF), led by Abu Agla Keikal, announced their defection from the RSF and their allegiance to the SAF. Comprised mainly of fighters from the Butana region in eastern al-Jazeera,&nbsp;<strong>the SSF played a pivotal role in altering the balance of power<\/strong>. By January 2025, the SAF\u2014supported by DJF and SSF\u2014advanced, capturing Om al-Qura before pushing westward towards as-Shabarga, a key RSF defensive stronghold in Wad Madani.&nbsp;<strong>With the fall of as-Shabarga on January 9, the path was cleared for SAF to retake Wad Madani, officially reclaiming the city on January 11, 2025<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-columns is-layout-flex wp-container-core-columns-is-layout-7387b849 wp-block-columns-is-layout-flex\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-column is-layout-flow wp-block-column-is-layout-flow\">\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"1024\" src=\"https:\/\/insights-sd.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/Army-1024x1024.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-3485\" srcset=\"https:\/\/insights-sd.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/Army-1024x1024.png 1024w, https:\/\/insights-sd.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/Army-300x300.png 300w, https:\/\/insights-sd.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/Army-150x150.png 150w, https:\/\/insights-sd.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/Army-768x768.png 768w, https:\/\/insights-sd.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/elementor\/thumbs\/Army-r2dp7n0n2aknnmnh9o2c7lgcrmrhphrk6y0bvnvjpk.png 500w, https:\/\/insights-sd.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/Army.png 1080w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:100px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Factors Influencing SAF&#8217;s Territorial Advances<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Several key factors contributed to SAF\u2019s success in holding Wad Madani, including:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Defection of the SSF \u2013 This significantly weakened the RSF and disrupted their supply lines, particularly cutting off vital oil supplies from eastern al-Jazeera.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Coordinated Multi-Axis Attack \u2013 The simultaneous offensive from multiple directions limited RSF\u2019s ability to rapidly redeploy forces, effectively neutralizing their \u201cFaza\u201d tactic, one of their primary battlefield strategies.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These developments halted RSF\u2019s advance towards eastern Sudan and paved the way for SAF\u2019s future military operations towards Khartoum from the southeast.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:100px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Khartoum: SAF Operations and the Restoration of Links between Military Positions<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On September 26, SAF launched one of its largest offensive operations, advancing from the Wadi Saydna and Engineering Corps camps. This push allowed its forces to penetrate Khartoum and Bahri from Omdurman, ultimately linking al-Kadaro camp, north of Bahri, to Wadi Saydna base.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In January, the SAF initiated another offensive from North Bahri, moving southward to seize the Shambat and as-Safiya neighborhoods in an effort to break the siege on the Signal Corps. At the same time, forces inside the camp launched a counterattack from the south, advancing northward. The two forces successfully linked up on January 25, effectively lifting the siege on the Signal Corps and SAF\u2019s HQ, which had been encircled since the war broke out in April 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With this breakthrough,&nbsp;<strong>SAF achieved one of the key objectives of the September 26 operation. For the first time since the war began, it managed to connect all its major camps in Khartoum State\u2014except for the Armored Corps camp<\/strong>. RSF had spent the first eight months of the war isolating SAF positions in Khartoum by imposing tight blockades. However, this recent advance now opens the door for SAF to launch further offensive operations in the capital.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:100px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">SAF Control of al-Jeili Oil Refinery<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In northern Khartoum, SAF successfully regained control of al-Jeili Refinery through a coordinated assault from two fronts. One unit advanced northward from the weapons camp in al-Kadaro, reaching the refinery\u2019s southern perimeter, while another force moved southward from the city of Shandi. After establishing control over Hajar al-Asal, the latter force continued its advance, encircling the refinery. On January 25,&nbsp;<strong>SAF announced full control over the site, marking the complete expulsion of RSF forces from River Nile State<\/strong>. This victory also reestablished a critical supply route between River Nile State and Khartoum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:100px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">North Kordofan: SAF Control of Om Ruwaba and Advance Towards al-Obeid<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In North Kordofan, the \u201cas-Sayyad\u201d mobile force, advancing westward from White Nile State, enabled the SAF to secure several areas in the eastern part of the state after multiple unsuccessful attempts.&nbsp;<strong>This paved the way for their advance toward the strategically significant town of Om Ruwaba<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Gaining control over Om Ruwaba marks a critical turning point, bringing SAF closer to breaking the siege on al-Obeid, the state capital. If successful, this would establish a geographical link stretching from eastern Sudan to the town of an-Nuhoud, unlocking multiple military options, including:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Advancing towards al-Fashir in North Darfur.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Advancing towards Babanusa in West Kordofan.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Advancing towards ad-Dalanj in South Kordofan.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Each of these possibilities underscores the immense strategic importance of Om Ruwaba.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:100px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">North Darfur: Alleged Reinforcements from Libya and Battles West of al-Fashir<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Reports indicate that RSF are attempting to bring military reinforcements from Libya into Sudan. This move may be aimed at bolstering RSF units besieging al-Fashir or reinforcing their positions in Khartoum. While the RSF has not officially confirmed this, the DJF claimed it had engaged in battles in the northern part of the state and repelled an RSF attack with support from SAF\u2019s air force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In al-Fashir locality, the RSF continued to tighten its siege on SAF forces, seizing control of several areas west of the city. After a period of relative calm, clashes reignited as the&nbsp;<strong>RSF issued a 48-hour ultimatum for SAF defenders to evacuate the city but failed to make any significant gains<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Al-Fasher remains the last major city under SAF control in Darfur. Despite being under siege for over a year, the RSF has been unable to capture it, largely due to the presence of the DJF fighting alongside SAF, as well as the continuation of air supply operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:100px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Conclusion<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These developments represent some of SAF\u2019s most significant advances since the war began. In recent months, there has been a noticeable shift towards offensive operations, beginning with the capture of Jabel Moya. In contrast, the RSF continues to lose ground, particularly in central Sudan, without achieving any notable gains on any front. If this trend persists, SAF could be in a position to establish full control over central Sudan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Multi-Front Offensive Operations Shape SAF&#8217;s Advances Throughout January, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) continued their offensive in the central region, achieving significant victories that culminated in the recapture of Wad Madani, the capital of al-Jazeera State. The city had fallen under the control of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in December 2023. Since taking control of the strategic Jabel Moya area in Sinnar State last October, the SAF has maintained an offensive posture, reclaiming the cities of Sinja and ad-Dindir. In December, SAF also seized the Sinnar Sugar Plant, enabling further advances along the southern axis of al-Jazeera State. SAF Operations Toward Wad Madani In January, the SAF launched a coordinated assault on Wad Madani from three directions. From the western axis, forces advanced eastward from al-Managil, gaining control of several villages before reaching Mahala and at-Talha, located just 15 kilometers from Wad Madani. On the southern axis, units advancing from Sinnar captured al-Haj Abdalla in South al-Jazeera locality before pushing northward to as-Shukaba an-Nour, approximately 20 kilometers from the city. Clashes in East al-Jazeera and the Impact of SSF Defection Since the RSF took control of al-Jazeera State, the eastern axis has been a battleground, witnessing continuous clashes between SAF\u2014reinforced by Darfur Joint Force (DJF)\u2014and the RSF. Both sides have made advances and suffered setbacks. By late January 2024, RSF forces pushed eastward, reaching the \u201cMajor Khamsa\u201d area in al-Faw locality, al-Qadarif State, but were eventually repelled by the SAF. Despite multiple attempts, the SAF struggled to reclaim and hold East al-Jazeera. However, the situation shifted in October 2024 when the Sudan Shield Forces (SSF), led by Abu Agla Keikal, announced their defection from the RSF and their allegiance to the SAF. Comprised mainly of fighters from the Butana region in eastern al-Jazeera,&nbsp;the SSF played a pivotal role in altering the balance of power. By January 2025, the SAF\u2014supported by DJF and SSF\u2014advanced, capturing Om al-Qura before pushing westward towards as-Shabarga, a key RSF defensive stronghold in Wad Madani.&nbsp;With the fall of as-Shabarga on January 9, the path was cleared for SAF to retake Wad Madani, officially reclaiming the city on January 11, 2025. Factors Influencing SAF&#8217;s Territorial Advances Several key factors contributed to SAF\u2019s success in holding Wad Madani, including: These developments halted RSF\u2019s advance towards eastern Sudan and paved the way for SAF\u2019s future military operations towards Khartoum from the southeast. Khartoum: SAF Operations and the Restoration of Links between Military Positions On September 26, SAF launched one of its largest offensive operations, advancing from the Wadi Saydna and Engineering Corps camps. This push allowed its forces to penetrate Khartoum and Bahri from Omdurman, ultimately linking al-Kadaro camp, north of Bahri, to Wadi Saydna base. In January, the SAF initiated another offensive from North Bahri, moving southward to seize the Shambat and as-Safiya neighborhoods in an effort to break the siege on the Signal Corps. At the same time, forces inside the camp launched a counterattack from the south, advancing northward. The two forces successfully linked up on January 25, effectively lifting the siege on the Signal Corps and SAF\u2019s HQ, which had been encircled since the war broke out in April 2023. With this breakthrough,&nbsp;SAF achieved one of the key objectives of the September 26 operation. For the first time since the war began, it managed to connect all its major camps in Khartoum State\u2014except for the Armored Corps camp. RSF had spent the first eight months of the war isolating SAF positions in Khartoum by imposing tight blockades. However, this recent advance now opens the door for SAF to launch further offensive operations in the capital. SAF Control of al-Jeili Oil Refinery In northern Khartoum, SAF successfully regained control of al-Jeili Refinery through a coordinated assault from two fronts. One unit advanced northward from the weapons camp in al-Kadaro, reaching the refinery\u2019s southern perimeter, while another force moved southward from the city of Shandi. After establishing control over Hajar al-Asal, the latter force continued its advance, encircling the refinery. On January 25,&nbsp;SAF announced full control over the site, marking the complete expulsion of RSF forces from River Nile State. This victory also reestablished a critical supply route between River Nile State and Khartoum. North Kordofan: SAF Control of Om Ruwaba and Advance Towards al-Obeid In North Kordofan, the \u201cas-Sayyad\u201d mobile force, advancing westward from White Nile State, enabled the SAF to secure several areas in the eastern part of the state after multiple unsuccessful attempts.&nbsp;This paved the way for their advance toward the strategically significant town of Om Ruwaba. Gaining control over Om Ruwaba marks a critical turning point, bringing SAF closer to breaking the siege on al-Obeid, the state capital. If successful, this would establish a geographical link stretching from eastern Sudan to the town of an-Nuhoud, unlocking multiple military options, including: Each of these possibilities underscores the immense strategic importance of Om Ruwaba. North Darfur: Alleged Reinforcements from Libya and Battles West of al-Fashir Reports indicate that RSF are attempting to bring military reinforcements from Libya into Sudan. This move may be aimed at bolstering RSF units besieging al-Fashir or reinforcing their positions in Khartoum. While the RSF has not officially confirmed this, the DJF claimed it had engaged in battles in the northern part of the state and repelled an RSF attack with support from SAF\u2019s air force. In al-Fashir locality, the RSF continued to tighten its siege on SAF forces, seizing control of several areas west of the city. After a period of relative calm, clashes reignited as the&nbsp;RSF issued a 48-hour ultimatum for SAF defenders to evacuate the city but failed to make any significant gains. Al-Fasher remains the last major city under SAF control in Darfur. Despite being under siege for over a year, the RSF has been unable to capture it, largely due to the presence of the DJF fighting alongside SAF, as well as the continuation of air supply operations. Conclusion These developments represent some of SAF\u2019s most significant advances since the war began. In recent<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":3497,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[46],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4455","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-monthly-report"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.4 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Sudan Conflict Monthly: Multi-Front Offensive Operations Shape\u00a0SAF\u2019s\u00a0Advances - Insights I Sudan Conflict Dataset<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"The SAF is making advances through multi-front offensive operations, recapturing Wad Madani and key areas in Khartoum and North Kordofan. 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